MA in Cultural Astronomy and Astrology
Taster Content: Free will in the Cosmos

Taster Content: Free will in the Cosmos Nicholas Campion

This text is adapted from a draft of Nicholas Campion’s forthcoming book, Time, Myth and Fate.

This content examines concepts of freewill, fate and determinism and their relevance to astronomy and astrology, with a focus on western culture but we will touch on other cultures and we encourage students to consider wider perspectives.

The sense that the future is somehow preordained occurs in many cultures. Most people have the sense that some events seem to be ‘meant to happen’, or ‘purposeful’, or ‘fated’, at the same time we have the freewill to act independently. Many of us feel that sometimes we take free choices while at others our lives seem to be part of wider patterns in which we may have little choice.

We seem to be trapped in an eternal paradox, unsure when we are making free choices – and when we are not. We use words such as fate, destiny or determinism to describe different views that the future has a trajectory pointing to some kind of end. Perhaps the future is partly determined but open to change. All hard sciences assume some level of determinism because chemical and physical processes work themselves out in ways which might be outside our control. Religions which assume some kind of supernatural power give that power – goddesses and gods, or a single God or Goddess – the power to intervene in our lives. The theory of modern liberal democracy assumes that we are all free to make our own rational choices, but marketing and advertising, including political marketing, assumes that our choices can be unconsciously influenced. The question as to whether choice is free or not, or somewhere in between, is ultimately unresolvable.

In human experience the sense that we are self-controlled often co-exists uneasily with the sense that there are patterns in our lives, or that some events have a purpose or are ‘meant to be’. A classic example occurs when two people fall in love, fulfilling a destiny. William Shakespeare’s most famous fictional character, Hamlet, summed up the dual experience of being free yet subject to wider forces when he said ‘“The time is out of joint: O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!”.[1] Hamlet’s destiny was set at his birth and required that he intervened in fate: to fulfil a preordained fate required free action. This kind of problem is explored in a huge amount of literature from nineteenth century classics such as Charlotte Bronte (Jane Eyre) to modern writers such as the crime novelist Barbara Vine (A Fatal Inversion) or the science fiction writer Philip K. Dick (The Man in the Hight Castle).

The belief that we can develop freewill is central to modern psychotherapy. Stephen A. Diamond addressed the issue, asking

Do you believe in fate? Destiny? If fate does exist, how much responsibility must we accept for our lives? Are we responsible for everything that occurs to us–even choosing our own birth, as some suggest–or do we bear little or no responsibility for a cosmically, theologically or genetically preordained destiny?”[2]

He added that,

“When we habitually repudiate or slough off responsibility for negative thoughts, feelings, and behavior patterns and the effects of that behavior on others, we perceive ourselves as passive victims of powers beyond our control, for which we take no personal responsibility. Accepting responsibility for those problems for which we are accountable is prerequisite to changing one’s life.”[3]

There are many debates in popular psychological sites online, accessed by searching for combinations of psychotherapy, psychology, freewill, fate and fate.[4]

The cosmological evidence, as found in the regularity of solar and lunar cycles (and other astronomical cycles once they are measured) tends to point to an order to which all life is subject. In ancient astronomy, and in astrology up to the present day, the observation that the motions of the stars and planets can be predicted in advance led the conclusions that, if life is connected to these motions then human affairs can also be predicted in advance.

The question, then, which all human cultures seem to face, is to what extent the details of human life conform to this cosmological order and to what extent human beings can attain a degree of control over their lives by engaging with this cosmological order? This is one basis of magic and a, if not the, basis of astrology in most, if not all, cultures.

Philosophers have struggled with these problems and developed different formulae for solving the ‘fate-freewill’ problem. The reading will introduce discussion of forms of determinism such as ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ determinism and ‘compatibilism’ (in which freewill and determinism are compatible) and incompatibilism’ (in which freewill and fate are not compatible), which cast the usual ‘freewill’ versus ‘fate’ debate in a much more nuanced form.

The problem of the extent to which the future is predetermined runs to the heart of many discussions about the nature of the universe. For example, the assumption that, if the present is mathematically determined, then the future must already exist as a projection of such mathematical processes, is central to some modern thinking in physics. The problem arises from the question of whether even a fire, for example, is the result of the coming together of a series of mathematically-determined laws of physics, or the probable result of a combination of circumstances which are individually unpredictable.

The determinist position – that all things are predetermined – was formulated by the Stoics in the third century BCE. Within strict, classical Stoic philosophy the only part of one’s life that one could change is one’s state of mind an attitude reflected in Karl Marx’s aphorism that ‘Freedom is the recognition of necessity’. In other words, one is only free to do the things which one is obliged to do.

The Platonic position allowed for a different form of freewill, holding that, although material life brings strong deterministic features – one is born, grows older and dies in an unavoidable process – but held that the individual has considerable scope to affect their lives through the cultivation of correct wisdom and a proper lifestyle. Thus Plato introduces the concept of ‘moral determinism’ which is the concept that what befalls a person is based on their state of their moral integrity rather than the laws of physics. Plato, then allocated this concept to the notion of the cultivation of the soul, but later philosophers, such as the Dutch philosopher, Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677) would define what Plato considered was the soul’s work as the conscious seeking of one’s own freewill.

Christian attitudes then generated a still unresolved paradox as follows: on the one hand individual choice is necessary if forgiveness from sin and salvation is to be achieved but, on the other, if God is omnipotent he knows the future, if he knows the future the future must already be written, and individual salvation is therefore also predetermined. This paradox opened up questions around whether individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions. There have been different solutions posed to this paradox and one such solution was put forward by the Stoic Boethius in the 5th century CE, who suggested the idea that God existed in eternal time rather then what is now called ‘flow time’. In eternal time the past, present and future all exist simultaneously and therefore all things are known, but this eternal time still requires the unfolding of events in flow time. Eternal time could be equivalent to the Platonic ‘Being’ and flow time to Platonic ‘Becoming’. Another argument was put forward by Calcidius a 4th century Christian who created a Platonist model of determinism to challenge the dominate Stoic position. His solution was to suggest that God only knew ‘universals’ but not ‘contingencies’, defined as variations that happened within the wider concepts of universals. However God’s Providence as a form of hard determinism is still the Calvinist position and is also found amongst many evangelical and apocalyptic Christian groups.

The Stoic view has interesting implications when it comes to legal matters. According to the geneticist Steve Jones,

So fine is the balance between freewill and determinism raised by the Stoics and their descendants that the legal system remains uncertain about nature and nurture as a cause of crime. Often, it treats them as separate entities, balancing one against the other. This reflects a common – and to geneticists baffling – delusion that if a trait is influenced by genes it is somehow insulated from the environment. In fact, nature and nurture are not exclusive. Every attribute, criminality included, is influenced by both.”

The modern debate on determinism was largely initiated by the English philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), who pointed out that in law, the level of blame for criminal action which is undertaken in haste is less than for the same action done with premeditation. He asks us why?  On this point he demonstrates our acceptance of the idea of freewill (liberty), and suggests that freewill not only exists in the presence of determinism (necessity) but that it actually requires determinism for its existence – we can only freely choose if there is a level of determinism in the world around us. Hume is famous for his billiard ball analogy: if ball Y hits ball X it causes it to move, but we cannot demonstrate any necessary relationship between the two balls, of the kind that was suggested by Stoic ‘sympathy’. All we ever see are events, and any idea of a connection between them is the result of our own misplaced assumptions.

Hume saw our access to freewill not through our morality but rather through indifference, what he defined as  ‘Liberty of spontaneity’ – we are truly free when we make choices with little regard to the outcome. William James however rejected the ‘truth’ of determinism and moved towards what is now defined as a libertarianism where one believes that freewill is not compatible with determinism and because we have freewill (James used the idea that we do have regrets and/or guilt thus we could have acted otherwise in a previous situation) therefore determinism does not exist.  William James (1842-1910) extended Hume’s thinking by defining levels of determinism. His scale ranged from the softest of soft determinism to the hard determinism of causal determinism. His work lead to the development of the terms compatibilism, in which freewill and determinism are compatible, and incompatibilism, in which they are not.

Astrology uses the language of ‘cause’ and ‘influence’ and is often accused of Stoic-style universal determinism by its critics. However, the Platonic view is highly influential, and may be dominant, amongst astrologers. In Laws, when discussing the need for the maintaining the perfect order of the universe and the need for individual soul to return to this perfect order, Plato wrote:

“With this grand purpose in view he [god] has worked out what sort of position, in what regions, should be assigned to a soul to match its changes of character; but he left it to the individual’s acts of will to determine the direction of these changes. You see, the way we react to particular circumstances is almost invariably determined by our desires and our psychological state. So all things that contain soul change, the cause of their change lying within themselves and as they change they move according to the ordinance and law of destiny.” Laws 904 b-c.

Plato formulated one of the earliest comprehensive theories of time (see notes on Time, Fate and the Heavens). One theory that emerges from the Platonic model is that, if there is such a thing as eternity, all things must exist at the same time. This idea was summarized by St Augustine.

“But God comprehends all these in a stable and eternal present…Nor is there any difference between his present, past and future knowledge. His knowledge is not like ours, which has three tenses: present, past and future.”[5]

To extend this logic, if God knows the future then the future must exist (unless he decides to change it) and therefore our lives are predetermined and we have no freewill. Most forms of Christianity assume that we can choose and that, if there is a future, God can change it. Some forms (such as varieties of Calvinism) assume that everything is predetermined, including whether we will be saved and go to Heaven.

The concept of all things existing at the same time was turned into poetry by T.S. Elliot:

“Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.”[6]

And

“In my beginning is my end.”[7]

Or perhaps, all times don’t have to exist in the same moment, but we can imagine them as doing so. This is Andre Breton, the author of the Surrealist Manifesto:

The mind which plunges into surrealism relives with glowing excitement the best part of its childhood. For such a mind, it is similar to the certainty with which a person who is drowning reviews once more, in the space of less than a second, all the insurmountable moments of his life. [8]

Is it all in the mind?

Now you have read the Introduction we have suggested reading, below:

  • Nicholas Campion, A History of Western Astrology, Vol 1. The Ancient World (London: Bloomsbury, 2009) chapters 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 15.
  • Nicholas Campion, A History of Western Astrology, Vol 2, The Medieval and Modern Worlds (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), chaps 4 and 5.
  • Timothy O’Connor; Franklin, Christopher, “FreeWill”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/freewill/>.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is authoritative and accessible.
  • Kane, Robert. The Significance of FreeWill. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, esp. chapters 1 and 3.
  • Thomas Pink, Free Will: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
  • Lehoux, Daryn, ‘Tomorrow’s News Today: Astrology, Fate, and the Way Out’, Representations, No. 95 (Summer, 2006), pp. 105-122.
  • Solomon, Robert C. “On Fate and Fatalism.” Philosophy East and West, vol. 53, no. 4, 2003, pp. 435–454.

 

Conclusion

To conclude, we can see that there is substantial use of tragedy, both general features and specific plays. The key question is think about is to what effect: does this create pathos? Does it build up tension? Does it add emotional charge? Can sympathy for victims be created through the evocation of a generic voice often associated with the underdog and marginalized? Does our opinion of Dido change if we see her as a menacing Medea figure? Or lustful Phaedra type? And what about feelings of sympathy as the queen is swept up in an inevitable headlong descent from prosperity to death?

Footnotes

[1] William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, scene 5, lines 189-90.

[2] Diamond, Stephen A., ‘Essential Secrets of Psychotherapy: Fate, Destiny and Responsibility’, Psychology Today, Posted July 3, 2008. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evil-deeds/200807/essential-secrets-psychotherapy-fate-destiny-and-responsibility.

[3] Diamond, Stephen A., ‘Essential Secrets of Psychotherapy: Fate, Destiny and Responsibility’, Psychology Today, Posted July 3, 2008. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evil-deeds/200807/essential-secrets-psychotherapy-fate-destiny-and-responsibility.

[4] See for example, Patnaik, Trishna, ‘Free Will Versus Determinism’, Psychreg’, Published on: 14 June 2021; Last updated on: 06 January 2022. https://www.psychreg.org/free-will-determinism/ [accessed 27 November 2022];  Anon., ‘Free Will vs Determinism’, Psychologist World, nd. https://www.psychologistworld.com/issues/free-will-vs-determinism-psychology-reductionism [accessed 27 November 2022].

[5] Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972) XI.21 (p. 452).

[6] T.S. Elliot, The Four Quartets, ‘Burnt Norton’ lines 1-3.

[7] T.S. Elliot, Four Quartets, line 1, East Coker, line 1.

[8] Breton, André, ‘Manifesto of Surrealism, 1924, in Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press/Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1972), pp. 3-47, pp.38-39.